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Summary
;
This study investigated the effects of experience on several outcomes of coalition
bargaining. Students with no experience in bargaining, students with experience
in bargaining, and executives from industry participated in.-.a five-person "Apex"
coalition game. In this game one player could form a winning coalition with any
other single player, and could be excluded from the v/inning coalition only if the
other four players coalesced. Results replicated prior findings on Apex games, and
indicated only minimal differences between the different subject populations. The
impact of these findings on the question of the generalizability of coalition
results is discussed.
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Experience and Coalition Behavior:
The Question of General izability
Research on coalition behavior has been appearing with increasing
frequency in the recent literature (e.g., Komorita and Brinberg, 1977;
hhimlghan and Roth, 1977; 1978; etc.). One characteristic that is common
to almost all coalition studies is their sample of subjects, undergraduate
students. The often stated criticism that studies in behavioral science
are limited in their generality to undergraduate (primarily psychology)
students can also be addressed to studies in coalition behavior. Thus,
the current study was designed to compare the coalition bargaining behavior
of subject populations who differed in their knowledge and experience in
"real world" bargaining, including: (1) A group of students unfamiliar
with coalition bargaining; (2) A group of students with experience in
coalition bargaining; And (3) a group of executives, enrolled in a special
masters-level program, with little experience in experimental coalition
bargaining but, presumably, considerable experience in "real world" bargaining.
Vie.mng all interpersonal interactions as exchanges (e.g., Gergen,
1969) might suggest that all interpersonal interactions could also be
viewed as bargaining interactions. As Rubin and Brown (1975) point out,
however, this definition is so broad as to be effectively meaningless.
They refined this definition, and, for the present purposes, the elements
that are important in identifying an interaction as one that can be more
specifically identified as bargaining are (1) conflict of interest and
(2) the exchange of demands and proposalb. Thus, when boy meets girl
and romance ensues, we might not define the situation as bargaining. When
labor meets management, and discussions ensue concerning a new contract.
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b^rgaining is easil: rt-cognlzable. When the concern Is coalition
bargaining rather than dyadic b.argaJ-nlng, fewer situations are easily
identifiable. Large-scale international and interorganizational nego-
tiations may offer t'.a l'';St ex-^jnylos
.
Given fewer coalition lajgaining situations in the world, one might
e ipect fewer co.'.lltlon btk- J-iiers : Husbands and wives, car salesmen and
the:f-: customers, perchar. lu and consumers all engage in dyadic bargaining
but only rarely do they an£,age in coalition bargaining. The Increased
complexity inherent ii. coalition bargaining restricts the population of
interest almost bjr aeiinitioa. Thus, one might expect to find studies
of coalition behavior that include Intelligent, experienced subjects.
Unfortunately, as va heve Totea, this is unusual: most experimental
subjects have had little or no bargaining experlGnce,
This, study investigates two aspecue of experience: One is experi-
ence with coalit-ion br.rgalar'ntf names such as those studied in this ex-
periment. The processes involved in coalition bargaining can be assumed
to change as one becomes familir.r with the contingencies inherent in
co?iplex c'>ar'itirn gP-ines. Finding oneself baiug excluded from the win-
ning coalltictp, ft.r instance, might result in more rapid, extreme, or
effective attempts to alter the potential outcome when one is an exper-
ienced tiigair^er. E^-^irienc^ chould give a bargainer an advantage,
and if all players a::e experienced, the bargaining process should change.
The othei as)j^c<: of experience studied here, what might be called general
busineKS exparienct;, slight also give a bargainer an advantage. Merely
"having been around" night prepare one better for the contingencies that
might arise in a bargainirg encounter. Both of these aspects. of exper-
ience were si:udied ii til- cxpariuent.
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The setting for this research (i.e., the game studied) established
one strong position and four relatively weak positions in a flve-person»
"Apex" game. Apex games, originally named by Horowitz and Eapoport
(1974), are structured so that the strong. Apex player can form a coali-
tion with any one of the other players and can only be excluded by a
coalition that includes all of the other players. Thus, it establishes
a mixed-motive situation that is particularly taxing to the non-Apex
players, who have the choice of competing with one another to try and
form a coalition with the Apex player or cooperating with one another
to try and form a coalition among themselves, thus excluding the Apex
player. Various forms of this game have been studied by Chertkoff (1971),
Komorita and Meek (1973; 1978), Michener, Fleishman, and Vaske (1976),
Mumighan, Komorita, and Szwajkowski (1977), and Willis (1962). The
typical result Is that coalitions including the Apex form significantly
more often than the coalition of all the non-Apex players (Mumighan,
1978a). In addition to its frequent use in research with imdergraduates,
the game mirrors the fairly prevalent "real world" situation where a
leader (i.e., the Apex player) will be able to dominate if only minimal
subordinate assistance surfaces, but will not be able to proceed
effectively in the face of unified resistance.
METHOD
Subjects . There were 160 subjects in the experiment. Thirty were
advanced undergraduates and graduate students enrolled in a behavioral
science course in a commerce department. None of these subjects (here-
after called non-experienced) had previously participated in coalition
games, but each was given a lengthy introduction to the procedures to
_4-.
be used In the experiment (see below) . Ninety (hereafter called "ex-
perienced") were also Students, at the same level in school and enrolled
in the same course, who had played at least one coalition game (not an
Apex game) previously. This set of 120 subjects constituted the sub-
jects for a previous study that focused on theoretical tests of four
coalition models (t&irnighan, 1978b). The fact that one of the games
they played was the same Apex game as the one played by the remaining
forty subjects made this study possible. This last group of forty
subjects (hereafter called "executive") were enrolled in an Executive
Itosters in Business Administration program. Each had been out of
school at least ten years and held a managerial position with considerable
authority. MDst had completed an undergraduate degree; several had
completed graduate and doctoral degrees. Their positions and experiences
varied widely, including dentists, attorneys, real estate developers,
bankers, engineers, pharmacists, insurance executives, plant managers,
etc.
Procedure . The participants were given general instructions about
the coalition games in the class prior to the beginning of the experi-
ment. Several examples of the use of the procedure (in games not used
later) were discussed. The players were told that there would be 12
trials in the game, and on each trial, the winning coalition would divide
a prize of 100 points among its members. They were instructed to do as
well as they could (i.e., maximize their points). For the non-executives,
their performance determined part of their course grade.
Students were randomly assigned to groups. Each group played the
game for a total of 10 or 12 trials, where a trial was d'^.fined as the
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formation of a winning coalition. For each game, player positions were
designated A, B, C, D, and E, with player A having the most resources,
player B having the second most resources, etc.
During the games, the players were seated around a set of opaque
partitions that shielded them from view of each other and the experi-
menter. At each group's first session, or in the class prior to this
session, the experimenter read specific instructions about the proce-
dures for the games. The players made offers on each trial by means
of written "offer slips," which required indicating to whom one wished
to send his/her offers and also a proposal regarding the division of
rewards for the prospective coalition members. For example, if player
X wished to form an XY coalition, he/she addressed an offer to player
Y and specified a division of the rewards (e.g., 60 for X and 40 for
Y) on the offer slip. A player was required to send an offer slip to
each player included in the proposed coalition. Thus, if a player
proposed a four person coalition, three offer slips were sent, one to
each of the proposed coalition partners. Players were also told that
the three offer slips must be identical with regard to the proposed
division of rewards; for example, a player could not send an offer to one
person to form one coalition and a second different offer to another per-
son to form another coalition. This procedure, originally used by Komorita
and Meek (1973), allowed two-, three-, and four-person coalitions to form
in a single step. Thus, although large coalitions may be more difficult
to foirm, the difficulty was not inherent in this procedure. After the
players had completed the offers, the experimenter collected, examined,
and distributed them to the proper persons.
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After receiving an offer, each person could
accept or reject it by
marking "Accept" or "Reject" at the bottom of each offer
slip. A person
receiving more than one offer could accept at
most one offer, unless the
offers proposed the identical payoff division
for the same coalition.
Hence, each person could only accept offers
to form a single coalition
on each trial. Furthermore, in determining
the winning coalition, any
player's proposal, if accepted, had priority
over any offer he might
accept, thus committing hi^ to his or her ovn
offer. After the offers
had been accepted or rejected, the expermenter collected
the offer slips
and announced the winning coalition, if one
had formed. A coalition was
declared winning if all the proposed coalition
partners accepted the
offer. If no coalition formed because at least
one person rejected each
of the proposed coalitions, the procedure
was repeated until one had
formed successfully. This procedure allowed
for acceptance within the
group of two or three proposals on the same
trial. For instance, if A
sent an offer to C, D sent an offer to A,
and both offers were accepted,
AC would be declared the winning coalition
because A was committed to
his/her offer (invalidating his/her acceptance).
While the offer D sent
to A did not result in a coalition, it
indicated the exact nature (I.e.,
how much he/she was willing to offer) of D's
interest. If three coali-
tions formed in this manner, with each being
invalidatd by another, the
players were informed of the situation and the
trial was rerun.
A practice trial was conducted before the
start of the first session,
limnediately after the practice trial, the players
were assigned to their
positions for that game. Lists of the resources
(i.e., votes) for each
position and the winning coalitions were also
provided. No verbal com-
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munication was permitted thereafter; hence, the players could not identify
each others' positions once the session had begun.
Some changes were necessary in the procedures used with the ejcecu-
tives because their restricted schedules forced all of them to play the
game in one of two separate sessions, with twenty subjects in each ses-
sion. Instead of being seated behind partitions, executives were seated
one behind another in a row of five people. There were two rows In each
of two class rooms. Offers, acceptances, and rejections were collected
by an experimenter who walked up and down the aisle next to each row of
participants. Because of the presence of two groups in a single room,
agreements were not announced verbally, but were displayed on posters
that could be seen only by the appropriate group. Thus, each group
member was informed about each of the agreements, and was not informed
about the agreements reached by the other group that met in the same
room. Also due to time constraints, four of the eight executive
groups were given revised last-trial information during their session.
At approximately the sixth trial, these four groups were informed that
they would only continue for 10 trials, and that their tenth trial would
be the last one for their group. Thus, four of the executive groups
completed 10 trials and four completed 12.
Design . Thirty of the non-executives (the six non-experienced
groups) and the 40 executives played the Apex game without having
been exposed to other coalition games. The remaining 90 non -executives
(the 18 experienced groups) had played one, two, or three different coal-
ition games prior to playing the Apex game. These three sets of groups
comprised the experience factor.
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As mentioned, the groups played either 10 or 12 trials. To inake
these different sequences comparable, the average payoffs, demands, and
number of offers of the players were calculated for each of four trial
blocks. For the 12 trial sessions, each block consisted of three trials.
For the 10 trial sessions, the first and last blocks included two trials;
the second and third included three trials. Thus, trial blocks was a
repeated factor with four levels.
The third factor was the position the players were assigned to
(i.e.. A, B, C, D, or E) . As the Apex and non-Apex players were not
particularly comparable, they were not included in the same analyses.
Instead separate analyses were conducted for the Apex players and for
the non-Apex players, where the non-Apex analyses had an additional
four level, between subjects factor, the positions of the players
(B, C, D, or E).
RESULTS
The frequencies of the different minimum winning coalitions (i.e.,
coalitions that will no longer be winning with the absence of any member)
for the different experience conditions are shown in Table 1. In all
three conditions, each of the two person coalitions occurred more fre-
quently than the four-person, non-Apex coalition (BCDE). There is some
disparity among the groups when the frequencies of the four two-player
coalitions are compared. In the non-experienced groups, the AB coalition
was relatively more frequent than in the other conditions; in the execu-
tive groups, the AE coalition was relatively more frequent. Both of these
disparities were apparently due to the formation of relatively stable
coalitions in three of the fourteen groups in these two conditions—one
InserL Table 1 fbcut her
3
in the non-experienced groups and t\70 in the exe .utive groups. These
stable coalitions continued to form for several consecutive trials, in-
creasing the overall frequencies of the AB and AE coalitions in the
respective conditions. Overall, the BCDE coalition was less frequent
than any of the Apex coalitions, for each condition. This finding
replicates previous research on Apex games, which has uniformly found
a low incidence of non-Apex coalitions.
The payoffs the Apex players received when they were included in
the winning coalition, their demands, the nuiiiber of offers they received,
and the overall payoffs they received, are displayed in Table 2. Each of
the first three variables vrere analysed in an experience by trial blocks
analysis of variance, with expe:?ience . bet een factor and trial blocks
a withii.^, repeated factor, Qverdl payoffs -r^re analyzec' in a one-way
analysis of variance over experienco. conditions. ?^o interactions between
experience and trial blocks and only one main effect, for the Apex
players' demandu, rertvtted, A3t:houj;h Tab;.. 2 indicates e ^me viriation
in the -ayoffs Apey players receiv^u:,. t^e payoifs recalved by the execu-
tives fell between those received by the two student groups, the non-
experienced and ard ^rperienciid
.
In'-ert Table 2 abotxt here
These results also parallel these found in previous research and
support the predictions cf the K/O irodels uosi frequently supported,
bargaining theory (Komo'- '.ta and Chertkoff, 1973) and the weighted prob-
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ability model (Komorita, 1974). The Apex players' payoffs when Included
in the winning coalition are quite close to the 75-25 predictions of the
weighted probability model, and the predictions of bargaining theory,
which range from 73 to 80, depending on the coalition partner. Thus, as
with the findings for coalition frequencies, these data replicate pre-
vious research, over all three experience conditions.
The results for the Apex players' demands do suggest that the
different subject populations may respond to the game in different ways.
The executive groups demanded significantly less, on average, than the
non-experienced student groups. (Post hoc tests, however, using the
Newman-Keuls procedure, resulted in no differences between the exper-
ienced students and the other two groups at the .05 level of signifi-
cance.) Again, these results might be due to the relatively small
sample size. Among the eight executive Apex players, two demanded
relatively little; the remaining six made demands much like those of
the six non-experienced student Apex players. This difference, then,
can be attributed to the behavior of two players. Further research
is warranted to see if this difference can be replicated.
A final analysis was conducted on the payoffs, demands, overall
payoffs, and the number of offers received by the non-Apex players. The
anova considered three factors: Experience, trial blocks, and player
position (B, C, D, or E). No main effects or interactions were found
for any of the variables for experience.
Discussion
The major focus of this paper has been a comparison of the behavior
of three sets of individuals in a coalition bargaining game. The data
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reveal no important differences aoong the groups as far as the outcomes
of bargaining are concerned. The coalitions that formed and the payoffs
which members of these coalitions received were very similar in each of
the three groups. One process variable, the Apex players' demands,
showed a difference among the groups, indicating that executive Apex
players, on average, demanded less than the non-executives. However,
even this difference did not affect the final outcomes, and seems to
be attributable to the behavior of only two individuals. Tnus, the
findings negate the typical argument that the results of coalition
research apply only to undergraduate students.
The data also tended to replicate earlier studies on Apex games.
Apex players were only infrequently excluded from the winning coalition,
and obtained a large majority of the payoffs when they were included.
Thus, not only are the different groups in this study similar to one
another on the basis of their coalition outcomes, but they are also
similar to previous samples. This should further contribute to con-
fidence in the generalizability of the results.
In addition, the fact that this study varied some of the procedures
used for the different groups warrants discussion. Because of time
constraints, the experimental procedures for the executives did not con-
form exactly to those used for the non-executives. While thJ-S suggests
that changes in the procedures may have established effects that were
cancelled by the changes in the subject populations, this possibility
seems remote. Instead, as Campbell and Stanley (1963) have noted, minor
variations in experimental procedures combined with similar results
across conditions increases confidence in the validity of the findings.
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In this case, then, confidence in the oftcct thr.t Als particular game
structure has on the outcones of coalition bargaining (i.e,^ that the
non-Apex coalitions are relatively infrequent and that the Apex player
gamers a substantial majority of the payoffs) is strengthened.
In summary, this study expands the boundaries of coalition research
to different subject populations. Further research on the generalizability
of coalition bargaining, investigating different procedures (Komorita
and Meek, 1978), different manipulations of independent variables, and
particularly different research settings (i.e., the field instead of the
laboratory) would be extremely worthwhile.
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FOOTNOTE
1. Elaborate procedures were instituted to insure that grading of the
outcomes of the experiment were fair, especially given the inter-
dependence of outcomes, and that students were not coerced into
participating. A write-up of these procedures is available from
the author on request.
Table 1
The Frequency of Coalitions in the Experience Conditions
Condition AB AC AD AE BCDE
Non-Experienced 25 14 11 14 7 71^
Experienced 40 47 42 56 31 216
Executive 16 12 11 40 8 87^
81 73 64 110 46
—An ABC coalition was not included.
—An ACD coalition was not included.
Table 2
Means of the Dependent Variables for the Experience Conditions
Non-Experienced Experienc ed Executives F^ P<
Apex Payoffs
When Included 80.0 70.8 73.1 1.21 ns
Apex Demands 77.
G
73.7 63.3 3.53 .05
Apex Payoffs
Overall
(Including
All Trials)
74.3 65.0 69.4 <1 ns
Number of
Offers to 2.43 2.53 2.64 <1 ns
Apex
Player
-%)egrees of freedom are (2,29) for each test.
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